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In this paper, we investigate whether different business models in the same industry (passenger 
air  transportation)  lead  to  different  corporate  governance  models.  We  found  that  low  cost 
carriers (LCCs) organise their boards differently from full service carriers (FSCs), in order to 
achieve lower costs and the faster decision-making process that is required by their business 
model.  We  also  found  that  LCCs  and  FSCs  solve  their  potential  agency  cost  problems 
differently. FSCs have more board committees in order to monitor management, and LCSs 
have a closer coincidence of interests between shareholders and management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Low cost carriers (LCCs) are frequently defined as airlines that supply no-frills flights for 
which passengers pay low fares. No-frills  means no expenses with catering  and other free 
inflight  services  and  therefore  the  “low  cost”  designation  for  this  type  of  firm.  However, 
studies on cost differentials between LCCs and full service carriers (FSCs) have shown that 
being  a  “frills”  or  “no-frills”  business  is  not  the  main  reason  for  the  difference  in  cost 
structures. A study by ECA (2002) estimates that LCC costs per passenger are about 43% of 
FSC costs. The estimates of Hansson et al. (2003) approach this percentage. What can explain 
this wide cost differential? The ECA (2002) study shows that the main LCC cost advantages 
are  due  to  a  higher  seat  density  and  no  inflight  catering,  minimal  handling  fees,  lower 
reservation  costs  (including  no  agents’  commissions),  higher  aircraft  utilisation,  cheaper 
airports, smaller administration costs, lower crew costs and homogeneous fleet. 
 
Only the first two factors are directly related to the no-frills concept. However, according to 
Hansson et al. (2003), “frills” account for only 5% whereas about 65% of the cost savings 
come from the product choice, and among them, the most important are business pace, process 
complexity and ticket distribution. 
 
It is not catering and other amenities that distinguish LCCs and FSCs as firms but rather their 
business model. As Franke (2004) states, LCC competitive conditions are a result of a different 
business model, based on quick, streamlined processes, or, in the words of Hansson et al. 
(2003), with “minimal complexity in products and processes”.  
 
A business model includes the choice of the product and of production processes, as well as 
that of a strategy for achieving a growing market share and higher market power. Taken in this   3 
broad context, a business model is nested inside the firm, but its survival closely depends on 
the firm’s behaviour in markets. When a firm pursues a business model, it must develop an 
internal  form  of  decision-making  and  control  that  is  adequate  to  that  aim.  Therefore,  we 
postulate  that  a specific  business  model should require that a firm should have a  specific 
corporate governance model. In other words, could it be that different corporate governance 
structures  coexist  within  the  same  industry,  on  account  of  different  business  models,  and 
independently of the legal and institutional environment? 
 
Research on  the implications of a  particular business  model on board and  other  corporate 
governance structures is still scarce. This paper attempts to contribute towards filling this gap 
in literature, by trying to answer the question above. In particular, we investigate whether 
LCCs are governed in a specific way, and differently from FSCs. Furthermore, we intend to 
investigate whether that specificity reflects in cost differences as well as going beyond the 
creation of decision-making mechanisms adapted to each business model, reaching monitoring 
instruments and thus the promotion of a closer coincidence of interests between shareholders 
and managers. 
 
We analysed the governance of 49 airlines. Our results indicate that LCCs have less complex 
and  less  expensive  governance  models,  which  enable  greater  agility  in  decision-making 
processes. In contrast, their boards of directors, or at least some of their components, are not 
designed to allow for a greater efficacy in monitoring and controlling top executives. But this 
does not mean that LCC shareholders bear higher agency costs. In fact, in these companies, 
executive directors have a higher share in equity capital, and this contributes to aligning their 
interests with those of shareholders.  
 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  present  a  few  remarks  on  corporate   4 
governance. Section 3 establishes the differences between LCC and FSC business models, and 
how corporate governance models may relate to them. Section 4 deals with our dataset and 
methodology. In Section 5 we present our models and results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FEW REMARKS 
 
Corporate governance includes all mechanisms that exist in the firms in order to establish: i) 
their objectives and the means of attaining those objectives; ii) control over the way those 
means work in order to ensure their efficacy and the effective prosecution of the firms’ goals. 
These mechanisms include the board of directors, the executive managers, and the relationships 
among them and with both shareholders and stakeholders (OECD, 2004).  
 
In many airlines, like in other firms, decisions are made by a few professional managers who 
often  are  not  shareholders  or  have  small  shares  in  the  company’s  capital.  The  separation 
between those who decide and those who hold the capital has important effects on a firm’s 
performance. Whenever shares are widely dispersed, agents (the professional managers) may 
have  a  high  level  of  discretionary  power  in  their  decisions.  First,  there  is  asymmetric 
information  between  managers (for  whom  more  information  is available)  and shareholders 
(who dispose of less information) (Myers and Majuf, 1984). Then, the agents’ objective may 
be the maximisation of their own utility, instead of shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). It is also recognised that competition alone will not eliminate all the possibilities of 
managers getting their own benefits (Nickell, 1996). Then there is a need for mechanisms that 
solve or minimise the problem of separation between ownership and management, and lead to 
efficient decision-making and to the pursuance of shareholders’ objectives. 
 
Literature on corporate governance indicates that its structures differ according to the legal and   5 
institutional environment of the firm.  In this context, two main corporate governance systems 
are identified (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997; and Franks and Mayer, 
2001): the Continental system
1, the main examples of which are Germany and Japan, though it 
is extensive throughout Western Europe countries, and the Anglo-Saxon system
2, which has 
the US and the UK as paradigms. Literature reports that they have significant differences as 
regards  ownership  structure  (Breuer,  1998;  Prigge,  1998;  and  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999)
3,  the 
structure and  behaviour of the board  of directors, and evaluation  and  control  of executive 
management (Breuer, 1998; Prigge, 1998; and Wymeersch, 1998). Literature also reports that 
capital  markets,  and  in  particular  takeover  threats,  play  a  different  role  in  management 
discipline  in  both  systems  (Jensen,  1988;  Franks  and  Mayer,  1996;  Prigge,  1998;  and 
Holmstrom  and  Kaplan,  2001).  Finally,  mechanisms  that  promote  a  better  coincidence  of 
interests  between  management  and  shareholders  are  also  different.  In  particular,  in  the 
Continental system it is less common to see a performance-based remuneration, or, when it 
does exist, the variable share of remuneration is smaller (Charkham, 1995). 
 
Differences between the two corporate governance systems are fundamentally the result of an 
historic evolution based on political pressures and options, which were developed in specific 
legal environments. The latter affect to what extent the firms’ ownership concentration and 
financing are maintained and to what extent shareholders’ rights are safeguarded. (Roe, 1994; 
La Porta et al., 1997). However, in both cases there is a certain degree of freedom, allowing 
firms to make choices that are adequate to their needs and specificities. For example, some 
papers  claim  that  board  design  is  influenced  by  the  scope  and  complexity  of  the  firm’s 
operations (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lehn et al., 2004; and Coles et al., 2005).  
 
                                                  
1 Also called relation-oriented system, bank-oriented system or insider system. 
2 Which is sometimes called market-oriented system or outsider system. 
3 Ownership structure is usually more dispersed in Anglo-Saxon countries (mainly in the US and UK) and more 
concentrated in Europe and Asia.    6 
3. FSCS VERSUS LCCS  
 
(i) FSCs and LCCs: Two Different Business Models 
The FSC business model is based on hub and spoke networks, combining long and short haul 
flights, often operated by code share agreements, and including airline alliances. The LCC 
business model is based on point-to-point services with quick aircraft turnaround, in order to 
maximise the utilisation of crews and aircrafts. Their strategy is based on tight cost control. As 
these airlines entered markets later, they must strive to achieve growth, which may include 
aggressive strategies, and so their decision making process must be quick. In Franke’s (2004) 
words, this last feature may be called a “quick business pace”. 
 
The main differences in the two carriers’ operations are based on (1) the airports they use, 
which have different requirements according to the alternatives hub and spoke or point-to-
point, (2) on cost control and (3) on business pace. 
 
(1) Airports – FSCs use large hub airports that are often congested and not designed for simple 
and quick handling procedures, and where the availability of adequate slots is scarce. Low cost 
carriers use mainly secondary airports with plenty of spare capacity and where they can often 
design handling and other procedures according to their own needs. 
 
(2) Cost control - Cost control is an important element of LCC management objectives. Airport 
check-in and handling procedures must be reduced to the minimum as far as what the company 
is responsible for. The small number of land staff must be efficient and both labour and other 
factors related to handling procedures should be simple and closely monitored. FSCs work in a 
more complex way. Negotiations of slots’ rights, code share agreements and alliances may lead 
to  considerable  transaction  costs.    FSCs’  long  haul  flights  increase  labour  costs,  as  these   7 
companies must provide accommodation for crews. LCCs rely on a point-to-point service, and 
crews often sleep at their own homes and so the companies save on accommodation and other 
items. FSCs use different types of aircrafts, which will have implications in rising engineering 
and maintenance costs and in the creation of their own maintenance firms, which, adding to 
catering  and  other  subsidiaries,  makes  their  organisational  structure  more  complex.  The 
homogeneity of the LCC fleet was chosen precisely to minimise these costs, and this type of 
airline often relies on outsourcing for this aim.  
 
As hub airports are often congested, FSCs are subject to higher congestion costs, which include 
direct and indirect costs of delays. Delays are another source of costs, but they also mean 
additional staff and departments to control connection delays and their effects. To these, add 
environment costs and their monitoring, by means of environment committees. The use of 
secondary, non-congested airports by LCCs reduces this kind of problem to the minimum.  
 
Finally, we must say that the FSC hub and spoke networks need a complex and expensive 
information system. Additionally, FSCs use revenue management systems, which also require a 
large amount of information. LCCs use much more simple procedures. 
 
(3)  Business  pace  -  Code  share  agreements  and  airline  alliances  mean  that  a  FSC  has 
commitments that involve transaction costs and take a certain time to be concluded or resumed. 
Additionally, hub and spoke networks themselves are difficult to redesign because of their 
complexity and of the airline agreements they include. FSCs therefore experiment difficulties 
in quickly accommodating changes in demand patterns, in regulatory legislation, or other kinds 
of changes. As Hansson et al. (2003) put it, FSCs have a slower pace business model.  
 
LCCs are not committed or allied to other carriers. In addition, they are young firms trying to 
get market power on the routes they operate, and some of them have been extending their   8 
network at a surprisingly quick pace.
4 This strategy requires the necessary funds to finance new 
routes and higher frequencies, as well as a quicker decision making process. In brief, the LCC 
business model is based on a quick business pace, while for the FSC model a slower pace is 
more adequate. 
(ii) FSC and LCC Business Models: Corporate Governance Implications  
Next we  establish  the  main  corporate  governance requirements of  LCC and  FSC business 
models and processes. We point out four dimensions that we consider to be most important.  
 
The first dimension is saving costs. Corporate mechanisms implicate costs. For example, the 
members of the board are remunerated. More members mean more expenses. Also, if the board 
works  in  committees,  this  implies  that  non-executive  directors  dedicate  more  time  to  the 
company.  This  dedication  must  be  paid,  and  this  means  higher  costs.  We  postulate  that 
corporate governance costs are positively related to variables like the number of directors, the 
number of senior executives, and the number of board committees. This implies that LCCs 
must have boards with fewer members, working with fewer committees, and a smaller number 
of top executives, in order to minimise the corporate governance costs. 
 
The  second  dimension  is  related  to  the  quick  (or  slow)  decision  making  process.  In  the 
previous section, it was stated that the FSC hub and spoke model is a complex process at 
several levels, namely with regard to the network itself, negotiations with airports, code share 
agreements,  fare  structures  and  hub  airports  with  congestion  and  environmental  problems. 
Routine changes, such as late arrivals due to congestion, overbooking, or others, and strategic 
changes, and network re-definitions, are difficult to accommodate within a complex business 
process.  Therefore,  FSC  adjustments  to  changes  and  consequently  their  decision  making 
process are slow, leading to a more complex corporate governance system, with larger boards, 
                                                  
4 To mention an example, Ryanair launched 69 new routes in 2005 and Easyjet launched 59 routes in the same 
year.   9 
more  committees and more senior executives. LCCs’ simple business process allows for  a 
quick decision making process. This fact is enhanced by the need for a very tight cost control 
and thus for the capacity for quick adjustment. 
 
The other two dimensions are related to agency problems, due to ownership and management 
separation,  and  include  executive  monitoring  and  executive  incentives.  The  LCC  business 
model depends on a tight cost control and simple operations. Thus it becomes both easier and 
more necessary to control operations, both routine and strategic, and agency problems should 
be less likely to appear. It follows that LCCs should have a smaller number of independent 
members on the board,  and fewer committees (such as an audit committee and evaluation 
committees). But at the same time the capacity for board monitoring of the executives’ actions 
would be reduced. If this is true, we can expect higher information asymmetry in LCCs than in 
FSCs, which may lead to less shareholder protection (3rd dimension). 
 
In order to minimise agency problems, incentives to senior executives should also be stronger 
in LCCs. Moreover, as these companies are striving to get higher market shares and therefore 
market  power,  they  should  pursue  more  risky  and  aggressive  behaviour  and  thus  better 
performance. To achieve good performance, high incentives are needed (4th dimension).  
 
Some papers establish the relationship between the scope and the complexity of the firm and 
some corporate governance issues. Fama and Jensen (1983), Lehn et al. (2004) and Coles et al. 
(2005) address the issue of the relationship between the scope of operations and the board 
structure.  However,  no  relationship  has  been  established  between  the  firm’s  corporate 
governance model and its business model. Also, and as far as we know, there are no available 
studies on the relationship between LCCs and FSCs and their corporate governance systems, 
though some previous literature provides a few interesting insides that allow us to consolidate 
some of our hypotheses.    10 
 
Kole and Lehn (1999) have investigated how airlines adapted their governance structure to the 
de-regulation process in the US, with a panel sample of 21 airlines from 1971 to 1972. They 
found that this adaptation was done gradually, and that new entrants have a more concentrated 
ownership structure, smaller boards and more equity-based pay.  
 
Carney and Dostaler (2006) establish a typology of airlines, according to the relation between 
ownership and corporate governance. They come to three types of governance systems: (i) 
managerial  governance,  (ii)  entrepreneurial  governance,  (iii)  stakeholder  governance. 
According  to  these  authors,  LCCs  seem  to  fit  better  into  the  pattern  of  entrepreneurial 
governance, but so do regional, cargo and express airlines. This pattern is characterised by a 
more direct control of management decisions, and so here it becomes possible to make quicker 
and more risky decisions, though there is a disadvantage with regard to capital needs.  
 
Though neither of the said papers distinguish between LCCs and FSCs, it is possible to infer, 
but with some caution, that the quick pace business model of the LCCs works better with less 
separation between ownership and control, and with a smaller board of directors. This is in line 




4. DATASET AND METHODOLOGY  
 
(i) Data  
Our sample contains 49 airlines. To select the sample, we started with IATA’s 265 members 
(IATA website), which represent about 94% of the world’s scheduled air traffic, spread across   11 
8 regions (Africa and the Indian Ocean, Asia and the Pacific, China, Europe, Russia and the 
CIS,  the  Middle  East,  North  America,  and  Latin  America).  Of  these  airlines,  and  after 
withdrawing cargo and postal services, those for which financial and corporate governance 
data was available on the respective websites were chosen (36 companies). Since many LCCs 
are not IATA members, 13 of these companies were added. They were taken from the 25 
largest LCCs in the world, in terms of number of passengers in 2004, according to Airline 
Business (2005); we included in the sample those for which data was available. Websites were 
the  main  source  of  the  corporate  governance  data  and  financial  reports.  We  also  got 
information  from  companies’  stock  exchanges  and  securities  commissions,  and  from 
Worldscope Databases. Data was collected for 2005. 
 
Airlines are distributed across Continents in the following way: 34.7% in Europe, 28.6% in 
Asia, 26.5% in America, 8.2% in Australia and New Zealand, and 2% in Africa. Of these 
airlines, 15 are LCCs, 43 are listed on a stock exchange, and 26 are Anglo-Saxon companies. 
 
(ii) Main Variables       
All details on the variables used in the performed regressions can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 1 describes the main statistics of continuous variables (Panel 1) and dummy variables 
(Panel 2). 
Insert Table 1  
 
The average number of the board of directors (BOD) is 10.5, whereas 50% of the airlines have 
fewer than 10 members. The same numbers for members of the executive committee included 
in the board (EMB) are 2.4 and 1.0, with 10 airlines without executives on the board. Senior 
executives register an average number of 7.6, with a wide variation interval, between 1 and 24   12 
(ESO).
5 The mean number of board committees (NCOM) is 2.3, while 50% of the airlines have 
fewer than 3 committees. Two airlines have 6 committees (the largest number) and 9 airlines 
have no committees at all.  The percentage of the variable in total executive remuneration (VR) 
ranges between 0% and 86%, but half of the airlines are paying their executives at least 31.3% 
in bonuses, shares, options on shares and other benefits. The State has a percentage of voting 
rights  (SSH)  exhibiting  a  mean  of  19.4%  and  ranging  between  0%  and  100%.  Capital 
concentration in the 5 major shareholders (MPS5) varies between 0% and 95%, with a mean of 
41.4%. Executive ownership (EOW) is also quite variable, and the mean of 3.6% hides the fact 
that executives hold between 0% and 27.4% of the capital. 
 
As regards our dummy variables, 15 airlines are LCCs and 34 FSCs. Only 6 companies are not 
listed on any stock exchange (LIST), and most of them have an evaluation and remuneration 
committee  (CAR).  Moreover,  38  have  an  audit  committee  (CAUD),  and  in  35  cases  the 
majority of the audit committee members are outside members of the board (ICAUD).
6 In 19 
companies  there  is  also  a  nominations  committee  (CN).  In  addition,  in  most  cases,  the 
chairman  and  CEO  are  different  people  (CHAIR).  The  distribution  of  airline  nationality 
between Anglo-Saxon countries (considered as those belonging to the British Commonwealth 
of Nations) and others is fairly equal, with 47% of the airlines based in non Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  
 
To assess the main features of corporate governance that account for the firms’ behaviour, we 
built two corporate governance scores.
7 The first one is CGI1, and intends to capture which 
characteristics of the governance system account for the complexity and celerity in decision-
                                                  
5 Senior executives are the members of the executive committee or, if the company has no executive committee, 
the top executives (i.e. the first line of managers) identified by the company. 
6 We approach the outside members of the board by the number of non-executive members of the board. 
7 Many authors have quantified the governance using scores. This is the case, for instance, of Bhagat and Black 
(2002) and Gompers et al. (2003).   13 
making  processes.  As  described  in  Appendix  1,  GGI1  is  positively  biased  towards  five 
corporate governance features that may increase the complexity of decision-making processes, 
namely:  the  separation  between  chairman  and  CEO,  the  number  of  senior  executives,  the 
number of board members, the number of board committees, and the proportion of outsiders on 
the board.  
 
The second corporate governance index, CGI2 is aimed at capturing the control of management 
discretionary power in order to reduce agency problems, and is also described in Appendix 1. 
A higher value of CGI2 indicates tighter management control, by means of combining several 
variables: the separation between chairman and CEO, the number of senior executives, the 
number of board members, the number of board committees, the proportion of outsiders on the 
board,  the  existence  of  an  evaluation  and  remuneration  committee,  the  existence  of  a 
nomination committee and a positive bias towards the fact that the audit committee, if existent, 
has a majority of board members that are outsiders.   
 
(iii) Methodology  
 
In  order  to  evaluate  whether  LCCs  and  FSCs  differ  with  regard  to  costs,  the  celerity  of 
decision-making processes and the control and motivation of management, we performed two 
types of regressions. First, we regressed a set of dependent (corporate governance) variables 
against  a  set  of  dummy  independent  variables  (including  a  dummy  that  identifies  LCCs). 
Second,  we  used  two  binary  regressions  (probit)  to  obtain  a  relationship  between  the 
probability of the airline being (or not) an LCC, and some corporate governance variables.    
 
It is well recognised in literature that in corporate governance studies we must always consider 
the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. For instance, if we try to distinguish   14 
LCCs  and  FSCs  by  means  of  models  that  include  ownership  and  corporate  governance 
variables as regressors, these variables may be endogenous. LCC versus FSC characteristics 
may influence the ownership structure and the ownership structure may influence, among other 
variables, the board size and structure. In this context, estimators are biased and inconsistent if 
the  latent  error  terms are heteroscedastic,  and  the bias  may be severe  (see, among others, 
Bhagat  and  Jefferis,  2005).  Some  authors  use  structural  models  of  simultaneous  equations 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) or else orthogonalise the endogenous variables (Denis and Sarin, 
1999)  to  control  for  endogeneity.  However,  others  claim  against  both  the  orthogonalising 
process and the models of simultaneous equations (Boon et al., 2004), and still others argue 
that simultaneous equations tend to yield results that are highly sensitive to the specified model 
and the identifying assumptions (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2005). In this paper, we follow Bhagat 
and Jefferis (2005) and we apply dummy variable regressions and probit regressions, using the 
bootstrapping procedure to correct the bias mentioned above. We apply the bootstrapping of 
the pairs (as in Bhagat and Jefferis, 2005) instead of the bootstrapping of the residuals because 
the first procedure is less sensitive to assumptions (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). 
 
The stylised version of the dummy regression model is: 
CG =  b0 + b1LCC + b2LIS + b3CGS + b4DSSH + b5DMPS5 +b7DSZ.  [1] 
where CG is the corporate governance variable that we try to relate to the type of airline and 
LCC, LIST, CGS, DSSH and DMPS5 are dummy variables. LCC is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the company is a low cost carrier, and 0 otherwise. LIST is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is listed on the stock exchange and 0 if not. CGS 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company’s country is Anglo-Saxon and 0 
otherwise. DSSH and DMPS5 are ownership dummy variables. The first one controls for state 
ownership,  and  takes  the  value  1  if  the  state  has  the  majority  of  the  voting  shares  and  0 
otherwise. The second dummy takes the value 1 if the five major private shareholders have the   15 
majority of voting shares and 0 if not.   
 
Our aim is to draw conclusions about the sign and the significance of the coefficient b1. We 
include CGS as a control variable because, as we said before, literature reports that corporate 
governance  mechanisms differ between Anglo-Saxon  countries and  the others (see, among 
others, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997; and Franks and Mayer, 2001). 
The variable LIST is included because listed companies are subject to some organisational 
constraints that are not applicable tonon listed companies.
8   
 
It has been suggested that the scope of operations influences the size of the board (BOD) and 
structure (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lehn et al., 2004; and Coles et al., 2005). Therefore it is 
necessary to control the effect on board size and those variables that are connected with it 
(ESO, CGI1 and CGI2) by a variable that expresses the size of airlines (SZ).
 In the air travel 
industry it is not adequate to evaluate a firm’s size by its assets. A suitable measure is output, 
which is computed (Holloway, 2003) as the number of ASKs (available seat kilometres). The 
variable SZ represents the size of airlines, measured as the average of the number of ASKs in 
the last two years, and DSZ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the airline has a number of 
ASKs higher than the median of SZ, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In the probit model we estimate one equation: 
LCC = b0 + b1CGI1 + b2WEB + b3NCOM + b4 DSC + b5EOW + b6VR + b7SZ.  [2] 
 
We intend to obtain information about how any of the independent variables indicates if an 
airline is a LCC or not. With this information, it may be concluded which corporate governance 
features are different in LCCs and FSCs. 
                                                  
8 Consider, for instance, the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on companies listed in the US.   16 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
5.1 DUMMY VARIABLE REGRESSIONS 
 
Results of the dummy variable regressions are presented in Table 2. We can divide the 15 
dummy equations into four groups. Equations (1) to (5) are related to corporate governance 
costs.  Equations  (1)  to  (8)  refer  to  the  airlines’  decision-making  processes,  independent 
variables  regarding  the  board  of  directors,  namely  its  composition  and  structure,  and  the 
number  of  committees  depending  on  it.
9  Equations  (5),  (6),  (7)  and  (8)  also  provide 
information about management control mechanisms in LCCs and FSCs. Equations (12) to (15) 
aim to eventually distinguish shareholding structures between both types of airlines, ownership 
structure allowing an analysis of the way executives are effectively monitored and controlled 
by shareholders. Finally, equations (11) and (12) allow us to check whether the two types of 
airlines are different as regards mechanisms that promote the coincidence of shareholder and 
executive interests, which may reduce agency problems. 
 
- Insert Table 2 - 
 
(i) Do LCCs have less expensive and less complex decision-making structures? 
Results clearly suggest that LCC governance structure enables less expensive and less complex 
decision-making processes. Equations 1 to 4 show that LCCs have smaller boards of directors 
and a smaller number of senior executives.
10 According to our results, the size of boards in 
FSCs exceeds by 3.30 members the size of boards in LCCs (equation 1). The same difference 
                                                  
9 We suppose that smaller boards and numbers of committees increase the celerity of decision-making processes.  
10 We have built a shorter version of equations (1) to (12), by withdrawing but decided not to include it in the text. 
In this version, conclusions about LCC coefficients and significances remain the same. This former version may 
be requested from the authors.   17 
is  of  4.66  for  the  number  of  senior  executives  (ESO)  (equation  3).  This  means,  at  least 
potentially, fewer corporate governance costs. Thus, both everyday decisions and strategic ones 
are made and controlled by a smaller number of people in LCCs, which indicates that the 
respective process is potentially quicker in these companies.  
 
The number of committees is also smaller in LCCs, though the significance of the respective 
coefficient  is  only  of  10%  (equation  5).  The  existence  of  a  large  number  of  committees 
increases corporate governance costs and the complexity of decision-making, both by creating 
several decision centres and by requiring additional formalisation of the decisions.
11  
 
Another  characteristic  that  distinguishes  the  LCC  from  the  FSC  is  the  weight  of  outside 
directors on the board. The variable WEB corresponds to the percentage of executive (thus, 
inside) directors of the total number of members of the board. Some literature reports evidence 
that boards of directors dominated by outsiders are slower in deciding and have less propensity 
to carry out spending on R&D (Baysinger et al., 1991) or to continue pursuing consistent 
strategies of innovation aimed at the creation of new areas of business and in the assumption of 
commercial  risks  (Zahra,  1996).  The  dominant  idea  is  that  outside  directors  have  neither 
enough information nor knowledge to quickly understand the component techniques of their 
respective businesses (Zechauser and Pound, 1990), and they do not dedicate enough time to 
company matters (Porter, 1992; and Turnbull, 2000). Thus the variable WEB will be positively 
correlated with the agility and quickness of the decision process. Equation 6 shows that LCCs 
have a higher percentage of executives on the board, thus being more compatible with a quick 
pace business model. 
 
                                                  
11 Consider, for instance, the nomination process with and without a nominations committee or the investment 
decisions with or without investments committees.   18 
The difference between LCCs and FSCs at the level of decision structures, in terms of the 
potential agility of the decision process, is also visible in the corporate governance index built 
for  that  effect  (CGI1).  The  negative  and  significant  coefficient  obtained  for  variable  LCC 
(equation  7),  expresses  evidence  that  LCCs  have  lighter  governance  structures,  and  so 
decision-making is faster, which accounts for a quick business pace, as defined in section 1.
12  
 
However lower corporate governance costs and faster and easier decision-making processes 
may be countervailed by a smaller power of monitoring and controlling management. The next 
question  refers  to  the  possible  existence  of  a  trade-off  between  these  apparently  opposing 
features. 
 
(ii) Are LCC corporate governance structures less prone to control and monitor management? 
Results for the next set of equations suggest that LCC control and monitoring structures are 
neither (at least, not as much as those of the FSC) follow the usual recommendations of good 
governance codes (Denis and McConnel, 2003)
13 nor are they what literature often refers to as 
efficient for the sake of management control and monitoring (Dahya et al., 2002). A smaller 
number of board committees and a lower percentage of outside directors may be understood as 
leading to a potentially smaller control over acts and omissions of executives.  
 
The second corporate governance score, CGI2, was regressed against the same dummies, and 
results show that the coefficient of LCC is negative (as expected) but not significant. This 
result  holds  when  DSZ  is  included.  It  is  therefore  not  possible  to  conclude  that  there  are 
                                                  
12 When the variable DSZ is added, results do not change much. DSZ is not significant in any of the equations 
where it was included. The variable LCC coefficient always keeps the sign and the significance level. 
13 In some countries, these recommendations were codified into law. This is the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, in the US, which includes, for example, a requirement that boards have audit committees that consist only 
of independent outside directors.   19 
relevant differences in this score for the two types of firms.
14 So, while the numbers of board 
members, executives and committees suggest that LCCs are organisations that do not allow for 
management control and monitoring as much as FSCs do, the index CGI2 does not reveal the 
same conclusions. 
 
Coefficients for LIST and CGS are as expected. In fact, firms from Anglo-Saxon countries 
have larger numbers of board committees (equation 5), which confirms that internal control (or 
the control of the board over management) is a priority in these countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997; and Franks and Mayer, 2001). But monitoring mechanisms 
are not the only instruments for controlling firms’ top executives. It is usually recognised that 
their discretionary power is smaller in firms with higher ownership concentration (Zeckhauser 
and  Pound,  1990)  and  that  a  firm’s  performance  is  positively  related  to  inside  directors’ 
shareholding (Morck et  al., 1988  and McConnell  and Servaes, 1990). Moreover,  it is  also 
widely recognised that a managers’ remuneration mechanism that has a higher share depending 
on their performance contributes to a coincidence of interests between them and shareholders 
(Hall and Liebman, 1998; and Morgan and Poulsen, 2001). Next we address this question, in 
order to evaluate if the non-conclusive result for CGI2 may be enlightened by means of the 
analysis of these variables for LCCs and FSCs. 
 
(iii) Do LCCs and FSCs have different ownership structures? 
Results presented in Table 2 show that there are significant differences between LCCs and 
FSCs concerning executive ownership (equation 12), State ownership (equation 10) and State 
plus major shareholders ownership (equation 15). However, the same differences are not found 
in the case of the five major private shareholder ownership (equation 9). Executive ownership 
                                                  
14 We tested other versions of CGI2, by changing the score of the variables it includes, but we never obtained 
significance for the results. These tests are omitted here but may be requested from the authors.   20 
is significantly higher in LCCs. This leads to a tighter coincidence of interests between them 
and shareholders, and results suggest that a higher executive ownership is the incentive LCCs 
have adopted to promote the closeness of interests between shareholders and managers and 
thus better performance.  
 
Though not significant, LCC has a positive coefficient in equation (13). Furthermore, the LCC 
coefficient has a higher absolute value in equation (14) than in equation (15), suggesting that it 
is  the  State  capital  that  makes  the  difference.  This  may  be  a  hint  that  private  ownership 
concentration is higher in LCCs. 
 
(iv) Do LCCs and FSCs have different remuneration schemes? 
Equation (11) shows that there are no relevant differences in remuneration schemes between 
the two types of carriers. We regressed VR, the share of variable in total remuneration against 
the same dummies, and LCC proves not to be statistically significant, though it has a positive 
coefficient.  However,  VR  is  higher  in  listed  and  in  Anglo-Saxon  airlines.  This  last  result 
confirms the numbers reported by Charkam (1995). 
 
(v) Are there other relevant variables? 
Other control variables might be added in the dummies’ regressions. First, if a company is 
distressed, this may account for eventual changes in corporate governance models, as a result 
of  shareholder  intervention  in  order  to  re-establish  financial  equilibrium,  and  models  may 
differ from those the company chooses in a normal situation. In our database, we found two 
companies in a distress situation. To account for this fact, we used two alternative procedures. 
First,  we  performed  all  regressions  excluding  the  observations  for  these  two  companies. 
Results did not differ from the original ones. Then we built another dummy variable (DIS) that 
accounts for the fact that a company is (or not) distressed, and performed all regressions adding   21 
this variable. Again, no substantial change in results regarding the significance and coefficients 
of variables was found. Coefficients of LCC keep the same sign and significance.  DIS is only 
significant when explaining the variable BOD. This is an interesting finding, meaning that in 
distressed firms the number of board members increases by an average of 6.3 members as a 
result of the need for more control over executives. Also, DIS is not significant in explaining 
the variable ESO.  
 
Second,  we  have  controlled  for  the  age  of  airlines  and  this  variable  did  not  show  any 
significance. It is true that LCCs are younger firms. In spite of that fact, FSCs seem to have a 
corporate governance model that is more according both to OECD’s principles (OECD, 2004) 
and  with  currently  considered  corporate  governance  best  practices,  such  as  regarding  the 
separation between chairman and CEO, the existence of a number of board committees and a 




5.2. Probit Regressions 
 
In order to confirm the previous dummy variables results we estimated a probit model, like in 
Bhagat and Jefferis (2005). Now the dependent variable is the dummy LCC, which assumes 
the  value “1” if  the  airline  is a  LCC and the value “0” if it is a FSC, while independent 
variables  are  continuous  and  represent  several  corporate  governance  dimensions.  This 
procedure makes it possible to estimate simultaneously the effects of several dimensions of 
corporate  governance,  such  as  the  celerity  of  decision-making,  control  and  monitoring 
structures and ownership structure. Table 3 summarises the results.   
   22 
- Insert Table 3 - 
 
The model leads to the conclusion that the CGI1 score is significant. This second methodology 
confirms  that  LCC  decision  mechanisms  are  less  complex.  This  confirmation  makes  more 
robust the result that LCC governance systems are designed in order to have a priority for 
smaller and more agile decision structures, in the characteristics that CGI1 captures. 
 
Variables WEB and NCOM, which were significant in the dummies regressions, are not here 
any more. Therefore, LCCs and FSCs are not significantly different from the point of view of 
the number of board committees and executive members, which confirms the results obtained 
in the previous section. 
 
This  model  also  confirms  that  executive  shareholding  (EOW)  is  a  relevant  variable  in 
distinguishing  the  two  types  of  airlines.  And  here  the  difference  concerning  management 
incentives  is  reinforced  by  the  statistical  significance  of  VR,  the  percentage  of  manager 
variable remuneration. This model enlightens a fact that had been left somewhat ambiguous in 
the previous section. Here it is clear that LCCs have a greater coincidence of interests between 
top executives and shareholders than FSCs, and therefore fewer potential agency costs.  
 
However, the results with the inclusion of SZ may change this conclusion. CGI1 and EOW are 
still significant at less than 5%, but VR loses its significance. This suggests that LCCs use 
higher  executive  shares  in  capital  as  incentives  for  a  better  performance  and  for  reducing 
agency problems, rather than a higher share of variable remuneration. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
   23 
The main objective of this paper was to investigate whether LCCs have different corporate 
governance systems, when compared with FSCs. In fact, much has been written about LCC 
competitive conditions, but very little about their corporate governance systems as allowing for 
these conditions. Some papers establish the relationship between the scope and the complexity 
of  the  firm  and  some  corporate  governance  issues.  However,  no  relationship  has  been 
established between the firm’s corporate governance model and its business model. Also, and 
as far as we know, there are no available studies on the relationship between LCCs and FSCs 
and their corporate governance systems. But some previous studies provide a few interesting 
insides that allow us to consolidate some of our hypotheses. In other words, little has been said 




We  first  established  a  relationship  between  the  two  types  of  carrier  business  models,  as 
described in literature, and corporate governance dimensions that would make those models 
work. Then, two sets of regressions were performed in order to establish the differences in 
corporate governance systems between LCCs and FSCs. The use of the bootstrap technique 
avoids endogeneity problems and makes our results more solid. 
 
Our findings indicate that: (i) LCCs have lighter and smaller governance structures, with fewer 
board  committees,  making  way  for  faster  and  more  agile  and  flexible  decision-making 
processes, (ii) LCCs offer higher incentives to managers, based mainly in senior executive 
shareholdings, which reduces potential agency costs and encourages better performances.  
 
Our findings have several implications. First, they suggest that a successful LCC should opt for 
corporate  governance  models  exhibiting  the  above-mentioned  characteristics.  Heavier 
governance  structures  (inherited  or  belonging  to  the  “parent”  airline)  may  represent  an   24 
additional reason in explaining the failure of some FSC low-cost subsidiaries. Second, when 
studying the effects of LCC entry in many markets, a subject about which there is extensive 
literature, corporate governance should be an important component of competitive conditions 
and not only costs and networks. Third, any kind of business model should be related to a 
corporate governance mechanism that is adapted to it and that makes it work, and so this may 
also happen, for instance, with regional airlines. And, fourth, when positioning LCCs in the air 
travel industry under new conditions (as with open skies or the sixth right), it is important to 
consider the impact of the eventual changes on their business models (for instance hubbing, 
long-haul, and consequent network changes) in their governance structures. 
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST AND DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
DUMMIES 
LCC = 1 if the airline is a LCC and 0 if it is a FSC; 
CGS = 1 if the airline is from an Anglo-Saxon country and 0 otherwise (we considered Anglo-
Saxon countries as those belonging to the British Commonwealth of Nations, in January 2006); 
CHAIR = 1 if there is a separation between Chairman and CEO and 0 otherwise; 
LIST = 1 if the airline is listed on any stock exchange and 0 otherwise; 
CAR = 1 if the airline has an evaluation and remuneration committee and 0 otherwise; 
ICAUD = 1 if the airline has an audit committee and the outside directors are the majority of 
the members of this committee and 0 otherwise; 
DMPS5 = 1 if the five major shareholders hold more than 50% of the capital and 0 otherwise; 
DSSH = 1 if the share of voting capital belonging to the State is higher than 50% and 0 
otherwise, 
DSZ = 1 if SZ (see below) is higher than its median and 0 otherwise. 
 
OTHER VARIABLES 
BOD = number of members of the board of directors; 
EMB =  number of  members of  the  executive  committee who also  belong  to the board of 
directors; 
WEB=EMB/BOD = percentage of executives on the board; 
ESO = number of senior executives; 
NCOM = number of board committees (Audit Committee, Nomination Committee, Evaluation 
and  Remuneration  Committee,  Corporate  Governance  Committee,  Strategic  Committee, 
Finance and Investment Committee, etc.), but not the Executive Committee; 
VR = share of variable remuneration of senior executives; 
SSH = share of voting capital belonging to the State; 
MPS5 = percentage of capital held by the five major shareholders  
DSC = percentage of free float = 1-SSH-MPS5; 
CSC = percentage of concentrated shareholder voting capital = 1-DSC; 
EOW = percentage of executive ownership; 
SZ = million ASKs, average of the last two years  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX VARIABLES 
 
CGI1 = CHAIR*4 + Quartile of ESO (“4” points for the major, “3” points for the second, “2” 
points for the third and “1” point for the minor) + Quartile of BOD (“4” points for the major, 
“3”  points  for  the  second,  “2”  points  for  the  third  and  “1”  point  for  the  minor)  + 
(NCOM/MaxNCOM)*4  +  “2”  points  if  the  majority  of  the  board  of  directors  are  outside 
members + “2” points if 2/3 of the board of directors are outside members. 
 
CGI2= CHAIR*4 + “4” points if the number of executives lies between 4 and 7, “0” otherwise 
+ “2” points if the majority of the board of directors are outside members + “2” points if 2/3 of 
the board of directors are outside members + CAR*2 + CN*2 + ICAUD*4. 
   29 






ESO 6.0 7.6 5.1 LCC 15 34
EMB 1.0 2.4 3.2 LIST 43 6
BOD 10 10.5 4.3 CAR 36 13
WEB 16.7% 22.0% 24.0% CN 19 30
NCOM 3.0 2.3 1.6 CAUD 38 11
FR 71.0% 70.9% 20.7% ICAUD 35 14
VR 31.3% 30.2% 21.8% CHAIR 18 31
SSH 0.0% 19.4% 29.1% DSSH 12 37
MPS1 15.3% 24.4% 21.8% DMPS5 19 31
MPS5 37.2% 41.4% 27.1% DSZ 25 24
EOW 0.1% 3.6% 8.1%
SSSH 0.0% 19.4% 29.1% Anglo-
SZ 26.2 53.3 69.2 Saxonic Continental
CGI1 14.0 13.7 3.2
CGI2 14.0 12.9 4.6 CGS 26 23
CGI3 22.0 20.9 5.4
Obs.: SZ in million ASKs
Panel I - Continuous Variables Panel II - Dummy Variables  30 
 
 
TABLE 2 - DUMMY VARIABLE REGRESSIONS 
Obs.: i) T-statistics  based  on the bootstrap estimates are noted below the coefficients.  Each set  of estimates is based on bootstrap 200 
replications of the sample. In each resample, without replacement, 40 observations were included; ii) N is the number of companies included in 
each pool of regressions (the number varies because of missing financial data); the dependent and independent variables were calculated as 
described in the appendix; iii) the symbols ***, ** and * show statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; iv) the alternative 
hypothesis is one-sided. 
 
Dependent Variables N LCC LIST CGS DSSH DMPS5 DSZ
[1] BOD 49 10.50 *** -3.30 ** 1.45 1.29 -2.18 * -1.11
4.42 -2.26 0.68 0.92 -1.30 -0.77
[2] BOD 49 10.97 *** -3.84 *** 2.04 1.30 -2.37 * -1.39 -1.34
4.38 -2.34 0.88 0.91 -1.33 -0.92 -0.86
[3] ESO 49 9.91 *** -4.66 *** -0.98 -1.47 -0.77 1.99
3.59 -2.67 -0.40 -0.87 -0.39 1.16
[4] ESO 49 10.21 *** -5.00 *** -0.60 -1.46 -0.89 1.82 -0.86
3.54 -2.57 -0.22 -0.86 -0.42 1.03 -0.46
[5] NCOM 49 1.74 ** -0.76 * 0.27 1.60 *** -0.49 -0.12
2.03 -1.44 0.36 3.18 -0.82 -0.24
[6] WEB 49 0.35 *** 0.11 * -0.16 * 0.00 0.03 -0.08
2.58 1.32 -1.31 -0.03 0.31 -0.93
[7] CGI1 49 11.16 *** -3.18 *** 1.87 0.63 -0.32 1.88 **
6.63 -3.07 1.25 0.63 -0.27 1.83
[8] CGI1 49 10.64 *** -2.58 *** 1.22 0.61 -0.11 2.18 ** 1.49 *
6.69 -2.36 0.82 0.65 -0.09 2.18 1.43  
[9] CGI2 49 10.35 *** -1.16 1.38 3.36 ** -0.46 0.53
3.91 -0.72 0.59 2.17 -0.25 0.34
[10] CGI2 49 9.61 *** -0.30 0.45 3.34 ** -0.16 0.96 2.11 *
3.73 -0.18 0.19 2.24 -0.09 0.62 1.30
[11] VR 43 0.03 0.01 0.19 ** 0.16 * 0.01 0.02
0.24 0.18 2.11 1.95 0.14 0.29
[12] EOW 44 0.03 * 0.07 *** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
1.31 3.87 -0.74 -0.77 -0.62 0.77
[13] MPS5 49 0.28 ** 0.09 0.05 0.15 **
1.77 0.93 0.30 1.71
[14] SSH 49 0.53 *** -0.23 *** -0.23 ** -0.13 **
4.13 -2.53 -1.81 -1.58
[15] CSC 49 0.86 *** -0.12 * -0.24 * 0.00
5.81 -1.29 -1.61 0.00
Constant Independent Variables  31 
 
TABLE 3 - PROBIT REGRESSION 
 
Obs.: i) Z-statistics  based  on the bootstrap estimates are noted below the coefficients.  Each set  of estimates is based on 200 bootstrap 
replications of the sample. In each resample, without replacement, 40 observations were included; ii) the dependent variable has a value of 1 if 
the company is a LCC, and 0 otherwise; iii) independent variables were calculated as described in the appendix; iv) the symbols ***, ** and * 






CGI1 WEB NCOM VR EOW DSC SZ
2.68 -0.49 ** 0.29 0.00 3.83 ** 29.28 ** 2.25
0.87 -1.71 0.10 0.00 1.46 1.66 0.95
2.80 -0.55 ** 1.27 0.12 2.76 31.66 ** 2.27 0.08
0.83 -1.78 0.39 0.28 1.00 1.56 0.98 0.94
Independent Variables ConstantRecent FEP Working Papers 
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